Terrorism+in+Cargo+Operations

= International Maritime and Air Cargo Shipping Anti-Terrorism =

Kenneth Morgan and Holly Gramkow ASCI 644 Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

ABSTRACT
This Case Study was submitted to Emery-Riddle Aeronautical University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of ASCI 644, Integrated Logistics in Aviation Management. The project required independent research to investigate if maritime container and air cargo anti-terrorism measures negatively impacts the international ocean freight transportation of goods between logistics ports of call and the United States (U.S.) economy. The case study concluded since 9/11 the global supply chain has made significant steps in reducing risk of terrorist attacks on our global supply regarding maritime container and air cargo operations. The Department of Homeland Security has led both the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Transportation Security Agency (TSA) through numerous initiatives. Both the CBP and TSA have implemented threat assessment systems which rely heavily on information and imaging technology to minimize potential impact to the global supply chain. It is estimated if a Weapon of Mass Destruction or Effect is detonated in the U.S. supply chain the overall impact to the U.S. economy would ranged from hundreds of billions to even trillions of dollars and generate a long term economic slump. Likewise the implementation of safeguards and anti-terrorism measures are expensive as well. The cost is passed on to government agencies, service providers, or shipping customers, the increase is absorbed in shipping rates or port and airport fees.

Introduction
International terrorism container shipping policy is a highly diverse and complex subject. The logistics industry has been treated as a special case concerning international commerce, since the September 11, 2001 Terrorist attacks on the New York City Twin Towers. Moreover, international cargo shipping by sea introduces problems in international relations affecting the way governments view each other, the way individual citizens view their own and foreign countries and the profit making capability of business entities among countries. The objective of this cross-sectional research was to enhance the learning experience of integrated logistics policy by examining the specific aspect of anti-terrorism pertaining to international maritime container and air cargo logistics ant-terrorism impacted the global supply chain. The following research question was provided to the instructor for research and analysis.

Case Study Research Question
Does the U.S. maritime container and air cargo shipping anti-terrorism measures provide new barriers to the global supply chain negatively impacting the U.S. economy? Research Methodology

As a cross-sectional study the research was accomplished by review and analysis of relevant data obtained through the course text materials, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Jack Hunt Library database searches and available government and industry media sources. As a non-quantitative study deductive reasoning was used to develop conclusions.

U.S. Anti-Terrorism Maritime Law
According to Balboni (2010) Several programs have been established to assist with securing containerized cargo, such as the Container Security Initiative--which combines intelligence to identify risky cargo, screening technology and more secure containers, are mandated for certain U.S. shippers, but not all inclusive of every shipper around the world. The international community perceives terrorism primarily a United States (U.S.) and or United Kingdom threat, however incidents such as the toner cartridge explosives aboard two UPS Cargo Planes impacts the entire global supply chain. Balboni explained every country is a stakeholder in securing cargo and should be held directly accountable if an item originates in a country and experiences a terrorist event, such as an explosion and the country of origin should also be held to financial restitution. All countries should take terrorism seriously and openly share security information and if not then the country should be isolated from the global supply chain.
 * **Role of Technology **

According to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) technology is ever evolving in capability, standardization, and integration of information systems. Layered security is more effective in mitigating threats opposed to a single point of defense. Technology is critical in analyzing the many nodes of the global supply chain. Through the efforts of data acquisition and analysis, such as secure transmission of cargo manifest, scanning, and imaging of cargo are built into normalized business processes. The many data points collated into information provides key decision makers invaluable information to make critical decisions concerning safety, security and prioritization of cargo integrating multiple U.S. Departments and Agencies business processes.




 * ===Container Security Initiative (CSI) ===

According to the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Agency under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the CSI initiative was implemented within months of September 11, 2001 to protect global trade lanes between the CSI Ports and the U.S. CSI prioritization of implementation was based on trade volume and currently the following are participants: North, Central, and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and throughout Asia.



The focus of the CSI initiative is to assess the risk of a cargo container delivering a weapon. CSI institutes a security regime to ensure high risk containers are inspected at foreign ports before loading on an U.S. bound cargo ship. CBP officials work with host nation customs in establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers. The containers undergo screening by non-intrusive inspection (NII) and radiation detection technology inspection before being shipped to U.S. ports. CBP (2011) reports approximately 86 percent of all maritime containerized cargo imported into the United States is subjected to prescreening. CSI continues to expand to include: the World Customs Organization (WCO), the European Union (EU), and the G8 have implemented CSI security measures. The volume of containers transported by ship is estimated to 108 million containers a year. Approximately 90 percent of the worlds manufactured products are shipped transported by containerized ships. About 40 percent of all incoming trade to the U.S. arrive by ship. Other countries which are even more dependent on sea container transport are: the United Kingdom, Japan, and Singapore.


 * ===Container Screening ===

According to MarEx, a worldwide focus on securing the supply chain is required. The future will encompass screening techniques, such as: smart container systems, RFID container seal systems and fast-pass-through nuclear/radiological container screening systems. In the future smart containers will incorporate technology which include: anti-tampering, intrusion alerts, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and Global Resource Serialization (GRS) providing supply chain stakeholders real time image, status and location information of shipments (MarEx, 2010).


 * ===Customs and Border Protection "10 + 2" Rule ===

According to the CBP (CBP, Feb 2011) the Security Filing, branded as the “10 + 2” initiative, is a regulation which requires importers and vessel carriers to supply advance trade data pursuant to Section 203 of the SAFE Port Act of 2006 and section 343(a) of the Trade Act of 2002.

The SAFE Port Act requires the transmission of â€œ10â€ key data elements describing the cargo consisting of: Manufacturer, Seller, Consolidator, Buyer and Ship to names and addresses, Container stuffing location, Importer and Consignee record numbers, Country of origin of goods and the Commodity Harmonized Tariff Schedule number. The addition “10 + 2” data requirements is the Vessel Stow Plan and Container Status Message (CSM) Data. Filings are to be transmitted electronically via vessel Automated Manifest System (AMS) or the Automated Broker Interface (ABI). <span style="color: black; font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 12pt;">There are some third part logistics (3PL) providers which include the "10 + 2" documentation to support international shipping. APL is subsidiary of Singapore-based Neptune Orient Lines, a global transportation and logistics company engaged in shipping and related businesses. APL provides customers with container transportation services through a comprehensive network combining intermodal operations with information technology. A leading 3PL filer, APL can assist customers compliance with Importer Security Filing (ISF) requirements. More information on APL can be found at <span style="color: windowtext; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 12pt; text-decoration: none; textunderline: none;">[|www.apllogistics.com,] <span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; font-size: 12pt;">(APL, Feb 2011).

<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0in 10pt;">Security of containerized maritime cargo has been transformed after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. September 11, 2001. Several initiatives have been led by the Department of Homeland Security and agencies, primarily the Customs and Border Protection agency. The U.S. ports are not 100% secure, which is a point with several facets. Overall, tremendous work has been performed, not only to secure the U.S. ports, but to also work with international partners worldwide to secure the ports of the global supply chain which transports 40% of the world's manufactured products. The Container Security Initiative leads the effort with risk assessment to reduce the risk of containerized delivered weapons. CSI relies heavily on Information Technology and processing millions of data points enabling decision makers to assess supply chain risk.

Economic Impact of Maritime Container Security
According to the DHS the economic impacts to a port could range from millions to even billions of dollars. The closure of major U.S. ports would have a major impact, since approximately 20% of global maritime trade is conducted through the U.S.. Anti-terrorism responses do not equate to automatic port shutdown but is a measured response based on intelligence information. There are two notification systems: (1) Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) and (2) Maritime Security System (MARSEC) used by the United States Coast Guard (USCG). Resembling the TSA coding system a series of color coded alerts are issued to Federal, State and local authorities, the maritime industry, and the American public based on the threat assessment. The coding aligns between HSAS and MARSEC with the following designations: MARSEC Level 1 aligns with HSAS Conditions Green, Blue, and Yellow; MARSEC Level 2 aligns with HSAS Condition Orange; MARSEC Level 3 aligns with HSAS Condition Red. The threat assessment is balanced between security and maintaining the open flow goods. The cost of security is monitored closely as not to become a barrier to free trade. Terrorists and criminals may exploit many vulnerabilities in conjunction with need to keep trade flowing makes it extremely difficult to secure the global supply chain. The more security is integrated in common business processes the closer our global partners through international cooperation come to achieving a more secure and transparent supply chain (DHS, February 2011).

The CBP Agency also identified several economic factors. The CBP reported in 2005, 20 million sea, truck and rail containers entered the U.S. equating to 29 million trade entries and $31.4B collected in import duties. The CBP also reporting the processing of 431 million passengers all while supporting security during lawful trade and travel import vital to the economy. Booz, Allen and Hamilton provided a report in 2002 estimating the port closures in response to a discovery or detonation of a weapon of mass destruction or effect (WMD/E) over a 12-day period would cost an estimated $58B. The Brookings Institution estimated costs as much as $1trillion with the assumption of long term economic slump. In 2005 over 100 million containers moved through maritime transport, an estimated 11 million were offloaded in domestic ports offering an attractive target for illegal or terrorist activities. By 2020 it is estimated global economic growth will triple international trade with the most significant being in containerized cargo creating bigger ships requiring infrastructure upgrades (CBP, Feb 2011).

<span style="color: black; font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif'; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">Rusling (2009), reported after interviewing fellows for the Council on Foreign Relations for Ocean Governance based on a review of the DHS report on “Measuring the Operational Impact of Container Inspections at International Ports.” The report indicated the Congressional goal for 2012 was to screen 11 million containers entering the U.S. for nuclear or radiological material. However, only about 4 percent of containers were actually screened. The Study indicated at a rate of 5 percent the backlog would result in gridlock and scanning would cost a minimum of $108.77 per unit. After careful analysis of one month of data from 2006 containing 400-500 thousand records the team used computer models comparing multiple screening methods and recommended DHS convert to a "industry-centric" process, resulting in a cost of $10 per unit. The Congressional decision was still pending at the time of the article (Rusling, 2009).

<span style="color: black; font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif'; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">The economic impact to the supply chain could be catostrophic in ports are closed based on potential threats or the detonation of a WMD/E ranging from hindreds of millions of dollars to billions. Both the HSAS and MARSEC alert systems are designed to provided a measured response to add stability to the supply chain and minimize exonomic impact. Reported by Rusling (2009), only inspecting 4 percent of the 11 million U.S. port annual containers has placed a significant strain on resources averaging $108 per container. The study reviewed by the Council on Foreign Relations for Ocean Governance has recommended an "industry centric" approach inspecting all containers for only $10 per container.

Conclusion
The case study concluded a more detailed and expanded effort should be conducted to captured the entire site picture related to the economic impact of anti-terrorism measures have on the maritime cargo containerized global supply chain. The DHS reported technolgy is ever evolving in capability, standardization and integration of information systems across multiple departments and agencies. Information Techology (IT) is critical in analyzing the global supply chain and collating data for decision makers to manage potential threats. Numerous security initiatives rely heavily on IT. One major initiative led by the Customs and Boarder Protection Agency is the Container Securiy Initiative (CSI). The CSI team collects data collected based on the 10+2 regulation processing millions of data cross checks on cargo for the threat assessment experts to analyze. Lastly, U.S. and International Ports must be secure. Studies have documented millions to billions of economic impact with long lasting affects if threats are improperly managed or a WMD/E is actually denotated. Additional, studies note he estimated cost per container and volume impacts on process only a percentage of containers opposed to 100% inspection. The 100% inspection built in to standard processes was seen and the more cost effective with the least disruption to work flow. The case study concluded, maritime containerized cargo anti-terrorism measure may have a significant impact on the U.S. economy and the global maritime supply chain if improperly enforced or if a WMD/E is detonated.

References Maritime Section
APL Logistics, 10 + 2 Program - Security Filing Requirement, Retrieved February 12, 2011 from, []

DHS, Department of Homeland Secuirty, Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security, Retrieved Frebruary 14, 2011, from []

<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: -0.5in;">CBP, Customs and Border Protection Agency Container Security Initiative (CSI), Retrieved February 10, 2011 from, <span style="color: black; font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif'; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">[]

<span style="font-family: 'FranklinGothic-Book','sans-serif'; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">CBP, Customs and Border Protection, Container Security Initiative, Retrieved February 12, 2011 from []

<span style="color: black; font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif'; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">CBP, Customs and Border Protection Agency, "10 +2" Rule, Retrieved February 18, 2011 from, <span style="color: black; font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif'; margin: 0in 0in 0pt;">[]

MarEx, Maritime Executive, Future of Cargo Container Screening and Security, Retrieved February 10, 2011 from <span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif'; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; vertical-align: top;">[]

<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman'; line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: -0.5in;">Murphy Paul R. and Wood Donald F. (2010). //Contemporary Logistics// (10th Ed.). Upper Saddle River NJ. Prentice Hall <span style="color: black; font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif'; line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: -0.5in;">Rusling, M.. (2009, March). STUDY BLASTS CONTAINER SCANNING PROCESS. National Defense, 93 (664), 38-39. Retrieved January 25, 2011, from Military <span style="color: black; font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif'; line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: -0.5in;">Module. (Document ID: 1663466811). [|http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/pqdweb?] <span style="color: #0000ff; font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif'; line-height: 200%; margin: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; text-indent: -0.5in;">index=37&did=1663466811&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1296009024&clientId=17916

**Air Cargo Terrorism and Security Impacts on the U.S. Economy**
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Air Cargo Security and Counter-Terrorism
Since 9/11, air cargo, along with maritime cargo, became topics of focus for the Department of Homeland Security and of Transportation. Multiple acts have been passed since then to standardize and regulate the security, identification, and processing of air cargo. While all-cargo aircraft have similar security standards, the point of interest since 9/11 has been cargo on passenger aircraft. Passenger aircraft maintain a much tighter security plan on its cargo than that in all-cargo craft. The air cargo supply chain, from the known shipper, to any possible freight forwarders to the air carriers and aircraft themselves can be a vulnerable, complex thing. Security must be a focus at every point in that chain for air cargo security to really be a success.

History of Significant Air Cargo Security Events
From 2001 until 2006, there were several significant events in the world of air cargo security. From the Aviation and Transportation Security Act in late 2001 to the Known Shipper database being established in 2002 to the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005, air cargo security has been a hot topic and a point of focus for several government agencies. These agencies include US Customs and Border Protection, US Postal Service, Department of Transportation, Department of Treasury and the Department of Commerce. Below is a drawn out timeline of such events. It does not include any occurrences between 2006 and present day, including the attempted air cargo terrorist attack out of Yemen. (GAO 2005)

The recent attempted air cargo terrorism attack occurred on October 30, 2010 in New Jersey. A UPS aircraft originating in Yemen landed in New Jersey, where the pilot reported a suspicious package on his final approach. Eventually a branch of al-Queda from Yemen claimed responsibility and no one was injured. However, that particular event caused many people to question air cargo security in general, especially on those mail delivery aircraft that fly in and out of the US everyday. (CNN 2010)

Supply Chain Threats
The air cargo supply chain is large, diverse, and distributed, presenting a complex and daunting security challenge. The United States alone has a supply chain that includes 1.5 million known shippers, 3,800 freight forwarders (indirect air carriers), 300 passenger and all-cargo air carriers, and 450 airports. Each day, about 50,000 tons of cargo is flown within the US, two-thirds of which is carried on all-cargo aircraft and one-third is on passenger flights. Terrorists realize that the impact of destroying a passenger aircraft with cargo is much greater than an all-cargo aircraft. For that reason, the security needs to obviously be much tighter on passenger aircraft but all-cargo aircraft cannot be ignored either. There are several steps in the air cargo supply chain within the US. The chain begins with known shippers. These are firms with established relationships with air carriers or freight forwarders. Only known shippers can ship cargo on domestic passenger flights in the US. These known shippers can then either go directly to the air carrier to ship their cargo or they would use a middle man, the freight forwarders. Freight forwarders, aka indirect air carriers, receive the cargo from their known shippers and consolidate the paperwork and sometimes the actual cargo to prepare it for shipment on an air carrier. The air carriers then are the companies that actual own, maintain, and operate the aircraft themselves. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the most direct access and control over the air carriers. (Crowley and Butterworth, 2007)

**TSA and Congress Initiatives**

In November 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act was established. Amongst other things, it mandated improved screening and inspections of passengers and property, including cargo carried on passenger and all-cargo aircraft. Along with the 9/11 Commission, it recommended more attention be put on an improved system to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous cargo and the use of hardened containers to carry "suspect cargo." In October 2006, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was established, which implemented many of the 9/11 Commission recommendations, including requiring TSA to issue air cargo regulations. While it took some time, TSA has met these requirements. More than 75 percent of the TSA budget, about $5 billion a year, is devoted to aviation security. Simply screening passengers at US airports requires approximately 43,000 federal employees. A much smaller portion of their budget, about $55 million a year and 300 security agents, less than one percent of its personnel, are devoted full-time to securing cargo carried on passenger aircraft. Over time since 2006, especially in light of the attempted Yemen attacks on cargo in 2010, these measures have increased as more and more attention is focused on air cargo. (2007)



TSA Strategy
The overall strategic goal of the TSA is: "secure the air cargo supply chain including cargo, conveyances and people through the implementation of a layered, threat-based, risk-managed security system" (2007). There are four strategic objectives to go with this goal. They are: to enhance shipper and supply chain security, to identify elevated risk cargo through prescreening, to identify technology for performing targeted air cargo inspections, and to secure all-cargo aircraft through appropriate facility security measures. This multilayer strategy is achieved by the collaboration of all parts of the air cargo supply chain. TSA views its role as screening participants in the air cargo supply chain, establishing security programs for shippers, freight forwarders and air carriers, and attempting to oversee their compliance. However, the farther away an air cargo operation is from the airport, the more TSA has to rely on the industry to monitor itself and its compliance with security requirements. The responsibilities of each portion of the chain vary.

media type="youtube" key="3MRlq1KlJt8" height="351" width="576" align="right" g the certificates and credentials of freight forwarders and known shippers from whom they accept cargo.
 * Air Carriers -** The entity of the air cargo supply chain that TSA maintains the greatest contact with and strongest regulation over. Air carriers have security programs focused on verifyin


 * Freight Forwarders -** They receive cargo from shippers and consolidate the paperwork and the freight before delivering it to the air carriers. There are about 3,800 certified by TSA. They must control access to cargo by directly observing the build-up of cargo. They are also responsible to screen or inspect cargo if it's from a new account, depending on the description of the cargo, if it's picked up from a private residence, or depending on the method of payment.


 * Known Shippers -** There are about 1.5 million known shippers in the TSA database. They include large and small businesses, manufacturers, retailers, publishers, banks, government agencies, and individuals. They must meet TSA security specifications and have an established relationship with either an air carrier or freight forwarder. Only cargo fro known shippers can be carried on passenger aircraft. However, they only need to really establish a track record of shipments over a short period of time to qualify to be a known shipper.


 * Certified Shippers -** These are known shippers who voluntarily submit to more stringent security requirements intended to create a rigorous chain of custody of shipments. They would pay for initial certification and subsequent audits, but it's supposed to be an incentive because in return certified cargo would be subject to only secondary and/or random inspections. (2007)

Department of Transportation
The Department of Transportation has come out with some key points concerning cargo screening. They are using a multilayered approach to security, much the way the supply chain itself is multilayer. This approach includes enhanced screening requirements for known and established shippers, explosive detection canine teams, and no-notice inspections on cargo operations. Also, by the 9/11 Act, 100 percent of all cargo transported on passenger aircraft departing the US are screened. For all international inbound air cargo, 100 percent of identified high risk cargo is screened. The Department is also working with the World Customs Organization to create Operation Global Shield, which uses multilateral law enforcement to combat the illicit diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals used in making explosive devices. Just this year, the Department of Homeland Security paired up with the World Customs Organization to work with other nations, international bodies and the private sector to increase the security of the global supply chain. This includes adapting inbound cargo targeting rules to reflect the latest intelligence, prohibiting high risk cargo on passenger aircraft and working with the private sector to enhance the sharing of advance cargo data and electronic shipping information. (DHS 2011)

Economic Impact of Air Cargo Security
Ever since the increased air cargo security after 9/11, the government and industry has had concerns about the economic impact of the required changes. The cost of air cargo security options are significant to both the Federal government and the air cargo industry itself. The indirect costs on air cargo operations can also be significant and create long-term challenges. However, the potential costs of a terrorist attack, for loss of life and property and long term economic impacts, may be more significant than the cost of security but those costs are difficult to quantify. The process of inspecting 100% of cargo on passenger flights, which congress has suggested, would not only be complex but the cost may outweigh the potential benefit given the capabilities of risk-based targeting and selective screening that are currently in use. The amount spent on air cargo security measures has increased over the last several years, it typically only accounts for a very small percentage of TSA's overall operating budget for aviation security. However, this percentage could continue to grow as additional technology and resources are required for air cargo. The bigger question becomes who would foot the bill, be it either TSA or the Federal government. TSA has estimated that if they must fund the 100% screening policy that it could reach as much as $3.6 billion over 10 years. Then the idea of imposing fees on air cargo shipments for security becomes an option and those costs would ultimately be carried by the shippers and eventually the customers of their products. If these fees become too great, it is possible that domestic manufacturing and assembly costs will not be able to remain competitive in a global market. The risk then is it could become cost advantageous to manufacture the entire product overseas and this could result in a possible loss of manufacturing jobs in the US. Overall, the economic impact of any proposal to impose security-related fees on air cargo will need to be evaluated to avoid or minimize any unintended impacts on manufacturers and their suppliers. (CRS 2007)

The Way Forward
Following the Department's attempt to enhance cargo data and electronic shipping information, AEB (International) Ltd. has created a software that helps with just that. The company created the technology because they feel global acting companies should have electronic systems in place to make sure they comply with global anti-terrorist regulations. They have long been a leading provider of supply chain management software in Europe. They developed the software, ASSIST4 Compliance, for comprehensive risk management in global commerce and it covers supply chain security, denied-party address screening, Authorized Economic Operator (AEO), export controls, and license management. (NewsDesk 2010)

Conclusion
While the global air cargo supply chain can be extensive and complex, that does not excuse a lack of security at any step of the process. Especially after 9/11, security on the entire supply chain must be a focus for those companies and individuals involved. The Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation are using every tool they have available, from congressional acts to databases of approved and nonapproved shippers, to combat the possibility of terrorism in US cargo. While this is a global issue, the US is especially vulnerable due to the sheer tonage of cargo that is imported and exported everyday. Each step of the supply chain is ultimately responsible for their own security. Air carriers, freight forwarders and known shippers are all vital parts to the functionality as well as the security of air cargo. Also, while passenger screening is an obvious advance in air security, what most people do not see is the huge increases in cargo screening and securing. The economic implications of complete cargo screening are an ongoing debate, as the costs of security are continuously growing and someone has to pay the price, be it TSA, the government, shippers, or customers themselves. As that task becomes more and more complex and important, technology must keep up and assist the users of the air cargo supply chain in accomplishing that task as expeditiously and securely as possible. The air cargo process can never go back to its earlier days of minimal security and it's up to each individual in that supply chain to be vigilant and accept security measures as a way of doing business.

References Air Cargo Section
<span style="color: black; font-family: Arial,sans-serif; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 0px;">DHS, Department of Homeland Security, "Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security," Retrieved February 15, 2011 from, <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; margin: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 0px;">http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/gc_1240598490142.shtm

<span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; margin: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 0px;">NewsDesk, "Latest Air Cargo Security Threat a warning for Supply Chain Industry, says AEB (International) Ltd," LogisticsWeek, Retrieved February 13, 2011 from, <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; margin: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 0px;">http://logisticsweek.com/air/2010/11/latest-air-cargo-security-threat-a-warning-for-supply-chain-industry-says-aeb-international-ltd/

<span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; margin: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 0px;">Crowley, P.J. and Bruce Butterworth, "Keeping Bombs Off Planes," Center for American Progression, Retrieved February 13, 2011 from, <span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif; margin: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 0px;">http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/05/pdf/air_cargo.pdf

<span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">GAO, United States Government Accountability Office, "Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security," October 2005, Retrieved February 13, 2011 from, <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,sans-serif;">http://www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/pubs/01.html

CNN, "Yemen-based al Qaeda group claims responsibility for parcel bomb plot," November 5, 2010, Retrieved February 22, 2011 from, []

CRS, Congressional Research Service, "Air Cargo Security," July 30, 2007, Retrieved February 27, 2011 from, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32022.pdf

Case Study Conclusions
The maritime container cargo case study analysis concluded a more detailed and expanded effort should be conducted to capture the entire site picture related to the economic impact of anti-terrorism measures have on the maritime cargo containerized global supply chain. The DHS reported technology is ever evolving in capability, standardization and integration of information systems across multiple departments and agencies. Information Technology (IT) is critical in analyzing the global supply chain and collating data for decision makers to manage potential threats. Numerous security initiatives rely heavily on IT. One major initiative led by the Customs and Boarder Protection Agency is the Container Security Initiative (CSI). The CSI team collects data collected based on the 10+2 regulation processing millions of data cross checks on cargo for the threat assessment experts to analyze. Lastly, U.S. and International Ports must be secure. Studies have documented millions to billions of economic impact with long lasting affects if threats are improperly managed or a WMD/E is actually detonated. Additional, studies note he estimated cost per container and volume impacts on process only a percentage of containers opposed to 100% inspection. The 100% inspection built in to standard processes was seen and the more cost effective with the least disruption to work flow. The case study concluded, maritime containerized cargo anti-terrorism measure may have a significant impact on the U.S. economy and the global maritime supply chain if improperly enforced or if a WMD/E is detonated costs to the U.S. economy are estimated to range from hundreds of billions of dollars to as much as $1 trillion. Similar to maritime container shipping the global air cargo supply chain can be extensive and complex, that does not excuse a lack of security at any step of the process. Especially after 9/11, security on the entire supply chain must be a focus for those companies and individuals involved. The Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation are using every tool they have available, from congressional acts to databases of approved and non-approved shippers, to combat the possibility of terrorism in US cargo. While this is a global issue, the US is especially vulnerable due to the sheer tonnage of cargo that is imported and exported every day. Each step of the supply chain is ultimately responsible for their own security. Air carriers, freight forwarders and known shippers are all vital parts to the functionality as well as the security of air cargo. Also, while passenger screening is an obvious advance in air security, what most people do not see is the huge increases in cargo screening and securing. As that task becomes more and more complex and important, technology must keep up and assist the users of the air cargo supply chain in accomplishing that task as expeditiously and securely as possible. The air cargo process can never go back to its earlier days of minimal security and it's up to each individual in that supply chain to be vigilant and accept security measures as a way of doing business.

The case study concluded since 9/11 the global supply chain has made significant steps in reducing risk of terrorist attacks on our global supply regarding maritime container and air cargo operations. The Department of Homeland Security has led both the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Transportation Security Agency (TSA) through numerous initiatives. Both the CBP and TSA have implemented threat assessment systems which rely heavily on information and imaging technology to minimize potential impact to the global supply chain. It is estimated if a Weapon of Mass Destruction or Effect is detonated in the U.S. supply chain the overall impact to the U.S. economy would ranged from hundreds of billions to even trillions of dollars and generate a long term economic slump. Likewise the implementation of safeguards and anti-terrorism measures are expensive as well. The cost is passed on to government agencies, service providers, or shipping customers, the increase is absorbed in shipping rates or port and airport fees